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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prescription of the prosecution for simple battery. It is submitted
that the result would probably be the same in Louisiana, since
manslaughter and simple battery are distinct offenses belonging
to different generic classes.9 This position finds additional sup-
port in Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing
with responsive verdicts, which provides that a verdict of simple
battery is not responsive to an indictment charging man-
slaughter.10
Ronald L. Davis, Jr.
FAMILY LAW-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-
PROOF OF PATERNITY
Plaintiff sued to have the defendant declared the father of
her illegitimate child and to obtain support of the child. Defen-
dant admitted his intimacies with the plaintiff and also admitted
that he had contributed to the support of the child. During the
trial the plaintiff admitted that she had attempted intercourse
with a man other than the defendant. The trial court found that
the plaintiff was not a woman of dissolute manners and held
that since the plaintiff had never had an unlawful connection
with any man other than the defendant her oath was sufficient
to establish the paternity of the child. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The trial court was correct in giving judgment on the basis of
the mother's oath, but should also have held that the defendant's
support of the child, his admission that he might be the father,
and his failure to deny paternity constituted an acknowledgment
of paternity. Rousseau v. Bartell, 224 La. 601, 70 So.2d 394 (1954).
9. For a discussion of the "generic" classification of offenses, see Com-
ment, 5 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 603, 604 (1944).
10. Art. 386, LA. CODE OF CraM. PROC. (1928): "The only responsive verdicts
which may be rendered, and upon which the judge shall charge the jury,
where the indictment charges the following offenses are: . . . Manslaughter:
Guilty as Charged. Not Guilty."
Different considerations are involved in the problem of former jeopardy.
There a distinction is drawn between the situation where two separate
crimes having some common characteristics arise out of the same series of
acts, and where a single criminal act constitutes a violation of two or more
statutes or articles of the Criminal Code. Former jeopardy principles should
bar subsequent action under the latter circumstance but not the former. See
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Criminal
Law and Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 281, 290 (1948). In the instant
case a prosecution or acquittal for manslaughter would definit3ly bar a prose-
cution for the battery.
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Articles 209 and 210 of the Civil Code permit the paternity
of an illegitimate to be proved only by:
(1) Private writings in which the alleged father has called
the illegitimate his child.'
(2) Public or private acknowledgment by the alleged father
in his conversations.2
(3) The alleged father's having educated the child as his
own.3
(4) The alleged father's having been living with the mother
in open concubinage when the child was conceived. 4
(5) The oath of the mother if she has never had an "unlaw-
ful connection" with any man other than the accused
before or since the birth of the child and if she is not
"a woman of dissolute manners."'5
Although the appellate courts have decided few cases con-
cerning alimony for illegitimates, Articles 209 and 210 have been
used to regulate the manner of proving paternity in several
cases involving informal acknowledgment and incapacity to
inherit.6 The court has held that the following acts of the al-
leged father constituted admissions of paternity under Article
209: calling the child his own throughout his life;7 giving the
child his name, publicly introducing her as his daughter and
taking her to his mother's home; s "habitually acknowledging"
the child as his own and calling her so in his conversation; 9
saying that a doctor who had told him that his children would
be afflicted did not know what he was talking about, "'for there
is Turner's wife as healthy as anybody'," coupled with the fact
that he was generally reputed to be the father; 0 and permitting
1. Art. 209(1), LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
2. Art. 209(2), LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
3. Ibid. "Educating" seems to be a mistranslation of the French "ever."
It is submitted that a better translation would be to raise, or to rear.
4. Art. 209(3), LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
5. Art. 210, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
6. Arts. 209, 210, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, also regulate the proof of pater-
nity or maternity in prosecutions under Art. 74, LA. CRIM. CODE (1942). No
questions of evidence have arisen under that article, however. See Note,
14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 898 (1954).
7. Succession of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1930) (acknowledgment
case).
8. Succession of Jones, 185 La. 377, 169 So. 440 (1936) (acknowledgment
case).
9. Gibney v. Fitzsimmons, 5 La. Ann. 250 (1850) (alimony case).
10. Succession of Vance, 110 La. 760, 762, 34 So. 767, 768 (1903) (inca-
pacity to inherit).
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children to bear his name, educating them, expressing concern
for their future, and keeping them at his house." On the other
hand, the court has held that the following acts of the alleged
father did not constitute admissions of paternity under Article
209: referring to the child as his son more than fifty years before
the trial in the presence of witnesses who were then young boys
unable to tell whether the remarks were made "in an affection-
ately playful manner or with serious intent-or perhaps in the
nature of braggadocio"; 12 and calling the children his own when
no one was present but the children.13 In the latter case the
court in a dictum implied that only oral admissions of paternity
made in "habitual conversations with others"'14 could be used
to prove paternity under Article 209.
In the instant case the court held that the giving of checks
drawn to "cash" to aid in supporting the child, the defendant's
admission that the child was possibly his, and his failure to deny
paternity "emphatically" constituted "sufficient acknowledgment
in compliance with Article 209. . ."15 It is submitted that checks
drawn to "cash" on which there is no writing to indicate for
what purpose they were given are not written admissions of
paternity and that the defendant's oral admission that the child
was possibly his was not an oral admission that he was the father.
It is further submitted that the fact that the defendant failed
to deny paternity is immaterial since the defendant is not re-
quired to disprove paternity.
The court in the instant case also held that although the
mother admitted that she had once attempted an unlawful con-
nection, "the act committed . . .did not result in sexual inter-
course and there was no unlawful connection. ."6 and there-
fore no reason to refuse credence to her oath. This is the first
case in which the court has discussed what constitutes an "unlaw-
ful connection" or "dissolute manners." The court could have
held that the mother's attempt to have an "unlawful connec-
tion" with a man other than the defendant was conclusive
evidence of dissolute manners. There is as much reason for
the court to doubt the oath of a woman who has attempted an
11. Bourriaque v. Charles, 107 La. 217, 31 So. 757 (1902) (acknowledgment
case).
12. Succession of Wallace, 219 La. 297, 306, 52 So.2d 858, 861 (1951) (inca-
pacity to inherit).
13. Badillo v. Tio, 6 La. Ann. 129 (1851).
14. Id. at 131.
15. 224 La. 601, 608, 70 So.2d 394, 397 (1954).
16. 224 La. 601, 610, 70 So.2d 394, 398 (1954).
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unlawful connection as there is for the legislature'7 to doubt
the oath of a woman who has had an unlawful connection since
the birth of the child. As stated by the court, however, no wit-
nesses were introduced to show that the mother was known
as a dissolute woman; and the attempt to have an unlawful con-
nection was not an unlawful connection within the strict lan-
guage of the Code.
Robert J. Jones
FAMILY LAW-THE DIFFERENT USES OF THE TERI "NATURAL
CHILD" IN THE CIVIL CODE
The term "natural child" appears in a number of articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code. The use of the term, however, does
not seem to be consistent and has caused some confusion in our
jurisprudence, as for instance in Minor v. Young' and Taylor
v. Allen.2 In this paper the uses and meanings of "natural child"
in our successive Civil Codes are considered and an attempt is
made to determine whether it is necessary to use the term
for an understanding of the law.
In France all illegitimate children are called natural chil-
dren.3 Children born of parents who could have married each
other at the time the child was conceived are called simple
natural children.4 Children born of parents who could not have
married each other at the time the child was conceived are
called adulterous or incestuous natural children.5 Only simple
natural children can be acknowledged." There is no specific
term to designate children who have been acknowledged; they
are merely called acknowledged natural children.
In the Spanish law as it existed at the time of Louisiana's
first Civil Code the term "natural child" seems to have been
used in several ways. Las Siete Partidas calls natural all those
17. Art. 210, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
1. 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921).
2. 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922).
3. 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS no 709 (2d
ed. 1952). Before the French Civil Code the term "bdtard" was used as the
term "enfant naturel" is now used. There were "bdtards simples" and
"bdtads incestueux ou adulterins." 1 MERLIN, RPPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE-
"BATARDS" 691 (4th ed. 1812).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Art. 335, FRENCH CIvIL CODE.
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